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Introduction
Over the past half century, the ability of the earth to support human activity has become an increasing concern. This concern arises from a long sequence of adverse impacts, from the effects of pesticides brought to the public's attention in 1962 by Rachel Carlson, to the emission of Greenhouse Gases leading to climate change. (1) In response to this concern the scientific community has begun to identify boundaries within which the effects of human activity should remain . (2) In the policy arena, this concern has led to suggestions for a shift toward sustainability in human activity. While the notion of sustainability is, in the words of a recent review article, (3) "creatively ambiguous," what is entailed in its pursuit is generally clear. It is the modification of human activity, to reduce the pressure it places on the environment. This paper's framing of the pursuit of sustainability as a "war" builds on other similar usage, such as President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty in the 1960s in the U.S. (4) As in Johnson's case, the use of the term war here is meant to convey the seriousness of the issue and the pressing need to address it. The identification of "three fronts"-lessening the environmental impact per unit of economic activity, lowering the rate of economic growth world wide, and addressing global income inequality-builds on the discussion in current literature. Tim Jackson's treatment of relative and absolute decoupling (5) brings the first two fronts into focus and makes it clear that success in addressing both is essential. Reports that consider the environmental impacts of success in development make the importance of the third front clear. (6) Framing the pursuit of sustainability as a "three-front war" indicates that progress on all three fronts is not only desirable but necessary. The purpose of the paper is to marshal evidence from recent work in economic history and other areas to support that point, to explain why fighting the three-front war will be difficult, and to begin to explore ways it might be fought and won.
The paper begins by presenting evidence supporting the characterization of economic growth since 1950 as "explosive" and showing how our current expectations have been shaped by that growth. Our world today is characterized as a global consumer society poised on the brink of affluence. To put a human face on this characterization, a group of examples explore the pervasive impact that explosive growth has had throughout the world. Turning to the pursuit of sustainability in that world, the need to substantially reduce both the environmental impact per unit of economic activity and the pace of growth in economic output is explained using the metaphor of running down an up escalator. Looking ahead, most of the anticipated growth in output comes from growth in income (i.e., output per capita) not population, so to lower growth in output one needs to lower growth in income. How might such a reduction come about? The paper argues for an income transition in which high income nations target reductions in working time rather than income growth, allowing the other nations to reduce the pace of their income growth while still closing the gap in income with the West. The paper does not discuss the income transition in detail. However, it does provide a computation showing that such a transition could, in principle, provide the basis for progress in the "three-front war." Vision and measurement are suggested as useful points of departure for this effort.
This paper is largely a work of synthesis and interpretation. There are, however, three things which are somewhat novel. The first is the development of numerical criteria for consumer, and for affluent and near-affluent societies. These criteria provide a quantitative basis for the claim that the world today is a global consumer society poised on the brink of affluence. The second is the use of the spread in income between the nations of the west and the rest of the globe as a measure of global inequality. This measure has particular relevance in the pursuit of sustainability. Finally, there are the descriptive devices-the three-front war, the escalator, and the income transition-used to develop the argument. While each rests on work by others, each brings a bit of novelty and, hopefully, clarity to the twists and turns of a complex argument.
The Long View
Today the business press routinely provides quantitative information on the state of the economy. Those who follow economic affairs are so used to receiving this information that it comes as something of a shock to recall that its availability is a relatively recent development. Data on the standard measure of a nation's economic output-Gross Domestic Product or simply GDP-only became widely available in the 1950s. However, economic historians have been able to develop estimates for earlier years. One of the most remarkable achievements of this sort is the work of Angus Maddison. Drawing on a variety of sources, Maddison developed data on GDP that cover the entire globe and span over 2000 years. (7) In addition to their remarkable scope, there are two features that make Maddison's data particularly useful:
• GDP is developed at the national level using the local currency. There are various ways to convert it to a common currency. Maddison uses Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), a technique designed to produce comparable data on the prices paid for consumer goods and services.
• As initially developed, data on GDP reflect inflation. Maddison's data have the effects of inflation removed.
These features ensure that, to the extent possible, Maddison's GDP data provide a consistent picture of output through time at the national, regional, and global level. Table 1 below provides global-level historical information drawn from or developed using Maddison's data. The information covers the pre-industrial and industrial eras (i.e., before and after 1820). The two eras are sub-divided, to indicate the variation in growth within them. Following Maddison, the financial data are all in 1990 dollars. Based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI), if the data were expressed in current (i.e., 2007) dollars, they would be about 60 percent higher. Table 1 begins with output. This is followed by population and then income, defined as usual to be the ratio of output to population (i.e., average real GDP per capita). The income data provide an indication of the amount of goods and services that could be provided to each man and woman, adult and child, if the output of the global economy were divided equally. While income is derived from output and population, it is often useful to turn things around, and think of population and income as giving the "length" and "breadth" of the economy's output. Just as length times breadth defines the area of a rectangular field, so population times income determines output. Thus, if population increases by a factor of 2.5 and income more than triples, output increases nearly eightfold. Since 1950 that is roughly what happened.
The spread, shown at the bottom of (8) Comparisons of incomes provide standard measures of inequality. What is new here is the use of the term "spread" and the focus on the difference rather than the ratio of incomes which is generally emphasized. (9) There are many measures of global inequality. Each provides a different perspective on the global income distribution. Gini coefficients, the most common measure of inequality, show stability, particularly since 1950. (10) Analysis based on the $1.25-per-day "poverty line" used by the World Bank suggests progress in poverty reduction. (11) Consideration of the spread shows that, even if one accepts these results, and many don't, (12) there is still reason for concern about worsening global inequality. The spread provides a measure of the difference in the goods and services that, on average, incomes in the West and in the rest of the world can purchase. The data in Table  1 show that over the industrial era massive income growth has been accompanied by an even greater increase in the spread. Since 1820 income has increased by roughly $6,000. However, the spread has increased by about $19,000. Most of the increase in both has occurred since 1950.
In large part it is our experience which shapes the future we anticipate. In particular, patterns of change in recent historic data provide the basis for "business-asusual" scenarios. Table 2 below shows such a scenario for the global economy in the year 2030. The output, population and income data were produced by Maddison and are wellknown. They have been widely cited by experts in discussions of macro-economic issues. (13) The spread for 2030 was computed from Maddison's income projections. Some will claim that a scenario based on "business-as-usual" is too optimistic. In the early 20 th century economic growth was below the rather wide range suggested by previous experience. (14) It is possible that experience in the early 21 st century will be similar. However, if the rate of growth through 2030 were the same as that seen from 1913 to 1950, a period with two world wars and the great depression, global output in 2030 would still reach $67,485 billion, about 65 percent more than in 2003. On the other hand, there are those who claim that Maddison understates the likely pace of future economic growth. Robert Fogel, who received the Nobel Prize in Economics for work related to long-term growth, expects a much more rapid pace. (15) In light of these considerations the more than doubling of global output in 27 years shown in Table 2 is a mid-range scenario.
Explosive Growth
The data in Table 1 make it clear how much of the growth experienced over the last two millennia is packed into the period since 1950. In the years through 1000 there was almost no change in output, population, or income. Over the next 820 years there was growth but its pace was very modest. After 1820 things changed dramatically. Within the industrial era the years since 1950 account for most of the increase. This "end-loading" of growth is particularly striking for output. In 1950 output stood at only 13 percent of its 2003 level.
There are two effects at work in Table 1 , each of which contributes to the remarkable change since 1950. First there are increasing rates of growth. For output the rate was .2 percent per year from 1000 to 1820, 1.6 percent per year between 1820 and 1950, and 3.9 percent per year since 1950. In addition, there is a "size effect." The growth experienced between 1820 and 1950 determines the starting point for the subsequent growth. Had growth rates remained at the pre-1820 level, output in 1950 would have been $918 billion, not $5,337 billion as shown in Table 1 . With this lower starting point, the growth of 3.9 percent per year since 1950 would have added $6,056 billion to global output in 2003, rather than the $35,576 billion that was actually added.
The combined impact of high growth rates and the size effect becomes greater as one moves closer to the current day. The period from 1990 to 2003 accounts for about one-third of the increase in output seen over the last 2003 years. Change at the pace maintained by the global economy since 1990 is rarely seen in day-to-day life. Were ordinary life to speed up to match that pace, very strange things would occur.
• Imagine a chance encounter with a friend's son who you last saw 3 weeks ago on his 10 th birthday. Suppose the child's growth over the 3 weeks bore the same relationship to his previous growth as the growth in global output since 1990 has to its previous growth. If the boy was 4 feet tall on his birthday, he would be 6 feet tall 3 weeks later.
A child growing 2 feet in 3 weeks would be shocking. For the global economy, packing one-third of the growth in output seen over 2003 years into the last 13 is an equivalent "growth spurt." However, it is not shocking because, in terms of human experience, 3 weeks is "short" while 13 years is "long."
The years since 1950 have been a period of explosive growth. Normally, when explosions occur, the response is to take cover and wait for things to return to normal. However, if the explosion goes on for decades it becomes part of ordinary life. That is where we find ourselves today.
Consumption and Affluence
Our world today is shaped by the explosive growth experienced in the recent past, and by the expectation that this growth will continue with only temporary setbacks. To begin coming to grips with that world consider a simple question. "What are we?" In responding to this question, context matters. Here the context is global. This rules out a host of parochial responses such as "We are Americans" or "We are Hindus." Answers will reflect the respondents' sensibilities and concerns. Some might say "We are all children of God." Others might respond that "We are part of the web of life on earth." One can imagine the same individual giving either of these responses if relations among different religious groups or stewardship of the natural resources that sustain us were uppermost in their mind when the question was asked. Here what is uppermost in mind is the impact of explosive growth. The response on which our discussion will focus is the following:
• "We are a global consumer society poised on the brink of affluence."
In the remainder of this section criteria for a nation or a region of the globe to be considered a consumer or an affluent society are developed and applied using Tables 1  and 2 and the data upon which they rest. The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 3 below. They show quite clearly the emergence of the global consumer society and the movement to the "brink of affluence" (i.e., near affluence). In the following section current attitudes and behaviors relevant to consumption and affluence are addressed. Together this quantitative and qualitative discussion provides a picture of the world shaped by explosive growth. It is common to refer to the nations of the West as consumer societies. However, most of the rest of the world is much poorer than the West. It may seem odd to refer to it as part of a global consumer society. Nonetheless, that description is becoming increasingly appropriate. Research has shown that individuals become "consumers" when household income for a family of four reaches $1,800 per capita (measured in 1990 dollars). (16) The $1,800 figure fits well with recent work by Martin Ravallion, a World Bank economist known for his analyses of global income issues. Ravallion defines the "developing world middle class" as those with incomes of $2 to $13 per day in 2005 dollars. (17) Expressed in 2005 dollars the $1,800 standard is roughly 50 percent higher, placing it at about the mid-point of the $2 to $13 interval. In 2005, out of a population of 6.5 billion, 2.6 billion were living on $2 a day or less, another 2.6 billion on $2 to $13 a day, and 1.3 billion on over $13 a day. The top group are all consumers. So are many in the middle group. Indeed, as a recent report by The Economist (18) makes clear, the process of becoming a consumer takes place gradually as income rises above $2 per day. Thus, in 2005 the number of consumers in the world was between 1.3 and 3.9 billion. The West and the other high-income nations, with a population of fewer than a billion, accounted for only part of them.
At a certain point, the number of consumers is sufficient to change the character of a nation or region, making it a consumer society. We define consumer societies as nations or regions in which the average income is at least twice the $1,800 level. This ensures that a substantial proportion of the nation's or region's population qualify as consumers. Maddison's data show that by 2003 incomes in all the major nations and regions of the globe except India and Africa exceeded the $3,600 threshold. In 1950 only the nations of the West had incomes that high. Looking ahead, Maddison's projection for India's income in 2030 is $7,089, far above the level required to become a consumer society. Based on Maddison's projections it is only Africa in which the development of a consumer society lags significantly.
The affluent society, discussed in John Kenneth Galbraith's well-known book (19) provides a second point of reference for global income growth. There are many things about the initial affluent society that were unique to the U.S. However, if one examines historical data on income for the U.S., (20) a general criterion for an affluent society can be developed. During the 40 years preceding the start of WW II the range of income in the U.S. was roughly $4,100 to $6,900 (in 1990 dollars). During WW II there was a dramatic increase. High levels of income persisted after the war. Post-war income of $8,900 or more rather than $6,900 or less provided the basis for the emergence of an affluent society in the U.S. 
Meet the People
As the data in Table 3 show, in 2003 about 70 percent of the world's population was part of a consumer society. Continuation of the explosive economic growth we have come to regard as "business-as-usual" will bring most nations and regions to near affluence in 2030. In coming to grips with the implications of these developments a few anecdotes about life in various parts of today's world will be helpful.
• Soon after the fall of the Taliban, Brenda went to Kabul with a group of relief workers. She intended to serve as an assistant to the mission's health professionals. Instead, once word got out that she was a hairdresser, she ended up doing haircuts every fifteen minutes all day long.
Brenda's experience in Kabul highlights the process of creating and maintaining an identity, a process in which the consumption of goods and services plays an increasingly important part. Throughout the world, and particularly in developing countries, there is continuing massive population movement from rural to urban locations. (22) Those who move to the cities lose the identity they had as members of an established rural society. How they look and what they own provide ways for them to construct a new urban identity.
• Vidya lives with ten members of her family in a single room on the outskirts of Mumbai, a large city in India. There is no running water or refrigerator in her home. There is electricity for three lightbulbs and a couple of fans. Vidya works at a bank. Her goal is to save enough to purchase a car. (23) • Casas Bahia, Brazil's largest retailer, has recently opened its first store in a favela ("slum"). Customers flock to the store because it offers installment purchase plans designed for those without credit cards or even bank accounts. As Maria, a resident of the favela explains, "Everything I have comes from Casas Bahia."
What is striking about Vidya is the gap between her current circumstances and her goal. There has been very rapid economic growth in India since the 1990s. When such growth continues over a period of years it becomes "reasonable" to plan, as Vidya does, for dramatic leaps in consumption. Vidya's goal mirrors the U.S. experience as it became an affluent society. Rapid growth in ownership of a wide range of consumer goods including cars was a defining feature of the early post-war period in the U.S. Maria's words explain all too clearly how aspirations such as Vidya's are becoming reality today. The emergence of a consumer society has been supported by the appearance of department stores and, more recently, shopping malls. Comparative studies show uniformity in these developments across the globe. • College students in the U.S. were asked to consider two different possibilities when they graduated and entered the work force. Either they would earn $50,000 a year while their classmates averaged $25,000 or they would earn $100,000 while their classmates averaged twice that. The students were asked which possibility they would prefer. Most chose the first. (26) • The Birkin is a luxury handbag. Despite its high price there has been a waiting period to purchase one. What creates such a demand? As the reviewer of the book, Bringing Home the Birkin, explains: "…for a woman of a certain class anywhere in the world, carrying one is the quickest way to telegraph to other women, 'I win.' And so some of them will do or pay just about anything to get one." (27) The behavior of the college students and "Birkin ladies" provide examples of positional concern-valuing one's income and possessions based on their relationship to those of others. For the "Birkin ladies" there is always something new-weekly sessions with the most sought after personal trainer or the most expensive vehicle to drive or be driven in-that allows the message "I win" to continue to be sent. Similarly, as the college students go through life, they can continuously shift their focus to ever richer peer groups, driving them to seek ever higher incomes simply to send the same signal, "I win." In these ways positional concern fuels insatiable demand. It goes a long way in explaining how the Rich manage, year in and year out, to absorb vast amounts of additional goods and services.
The Birkin ladies and others like them are the last link in a chain of aspiration which begins with billions like Vidya and Maria and binds together the global consumer society. In the U.S. historical studies have shown that, over time, the less-well-off portion of a population develops an ever broader set of "wants" which reflect consumption patterns among a higher income reference group. (28) Today a global version of this process is underway. The emergence and rapid spread of mobile phone use has helped to create a global reference group. Only a few decades after its introduction there are billions of subscribers worldwide. (29) Today's phones can take and transmit pictures, access the internet and show TV and video. And where are the Birkin ladies and their ilk in all of this? They are characters on TV programs and participants in "news" videos which increasingly define consumer aspirations worldwide.
Going Down the Up Escalator
Having "set the stage" we are now ready to address sustainability. A thorough discussion would touch on a wide range of issues including water use, preservation of biodiversity, and the environmental impacts of emissions of various types. Here, to keep things manageable, the discussion will focus on just one of the major concerns-climate change due in large part to the carbon released when fossil fuels are burned.
Recent historical experience leading to an expectation of continuing explosive economic growth provides the context within which the pursuit of sustainability needs to be considered. The linkage between carbon emissions from fossil fuel use and the increase in economic output seen since 1820 and expected through 2030 is described in the work by Maddison cited earlier. Intensity, that is the amount of carbon emitted per unit of economic activity, provides the connection between output and emissions. As shown in Table 4 below, intensity grew from 1820 to 1950. Since then it has fallen. Based on Maddison's projections, its rate of decline is expected to be even greater in the future. However, the effects of the decline in intensity have been and are expected to be more than offset by growth in output. As a result, emissions from the use of fossil fuels continue to grow. While their rate of growth declines over time, the amount to which the rate applies increases. The combined effect is shown in the bottom line of the table. The amount of carbon expected added to emissions each year through 2030 remains substantial. Table 4 depicts a world that was walking down an up escalator between 1950 and 2003 and, based on Maddison's projections, will be running down through 2030. The escalator is the growth in output. The pace of the walk and run is indicated by the rate of decline in intensity. While the declines shown in Table 4 may appear modest, over time the reductions in intensity they produce are quite large. Since 1950 intensity has been cut roughly in half. Looking ahead Maddison projects a roughly similar cut over half as many years. We can and should respond to climate change by "running," that is by striving to increase the efficiency of our fossil fuel use. However, while it is possible to identify options for improvements in efficiency, getting them adopted has proved difficult even when they are highly cost-effective. (30) Further, success in energy conservation efforts is often accompanied by "rebound" in demand resulting in additional fossil fuel usage. (31) Thus, running alone is a very risky response to emissions growth.
The details of the discussion just completed are specific to the use of fossil fuels. However, similar points can be made concerning a wide range of sustainability issues. We can and should be more "efficient" in our use of all non-renewable natural resources as well as fresh water and land, particularly forested areas. However, in each case, the effects of the "economic growth escalator" will offset the effects of increased efficiency. Indeed, as Princen has argued, pursuing efficiency generally fosters additional consumption. (32) Thus, as with fossil fuels, avoiding a risky reliance on increasing efficiency alone puts slowing the pace of growth in output on the agenda.
What are the prospects for a significant decrease in the pace of growth in economic output? To make an assessment one needs to examine the drivers of that growth. As noted earlier, output is the product of income and population. The data in Table 1 show that, over the industrial era, the contribution of population to growth in output has decreased and that of income has increased. Looking ahead, the projections provided in Table 2 continue this trend. Population growth accounts for only 30 of the 136 percent increase in output through 2030. Thus, getting off the economic growth escalator means making a set of personal and political choices that reduce growth in income.
The scenarios presented in Table 5 illustrate the linkage between growth in income and emissions. Both scenarios assume population growth and declines in the intensity of emissions as in Maddison's projections. However, the second scenario departs from Maddison, showing the change in income required to keep global emissions in 2030 the same as in 2003. This is a modest goal in light of the current climate change literature. (33) As the results in the table show, to achieve that the rate of growth for income needs to be cut to half of what Maddison projects. A drop in population growth would be a welcome addition to the no-growth scenario. However, rather than reducing the need for cuts in income growth, it would simply make a more appropriate bottom line-a decline in emissions through 2030-possible. The results in Table 5 show that the historically unprecedented pace of reductions in the intensity of emissions assumed by Maddison is insufficient to address climate concerns. In addition, anticipated growth in income needs to be cut substantially simply to hold emissions at their current levels. Unfortunately, that is not where we are headed. Among the Rich ever greater income and consumption remains the general objective. Affluence is increasingly the goal throughout the developing world. As income growth moves billions into the consumer society, the local and global media provide ever more distant points of reference, raising aspirations. Achieving affluence or vastly exceeding it rather than addressing climate change and other environmental concerns is the primary concern.
What responses are political leaders likely to offer to a suggestion to moderate their nation's income growth in order to address issues of sustainability? Those in the developing world will stress the need for and equity of income growth for them, to narrow the spread. (34) Unfortunately, leaders in the rich nations will also claim a need for continued income growth. There is plenty of "expert advice," urging them to hang onto their position at the top of the global economic hierarchy, (35) and indeed to see continuing growth in income as a requirement for progressive change. (36) The pattern of decisionmaking just described is what the economist Robert Frank refers to as "smart for one, dumb for all." (37) To find a way out of the dead end it creates it is useful to look at developments in the area of population.
An Income Transition
Change in population depends on the difference between the birth and death rates. Over roughly the industrial era two major developments involving these rates have occurred. First the death rate fell. Then, with a lag, the birth rate followed. This two-stage movement is referred to as the demographic transition. Here, it is the second stage of the transition-the lagged decline in birth rates-that is of particular interest. As with the changes required to reduce the death rate (38) and then to feed added billions, (39) the details of the second stage of the demographic transition are complex. However, looking beyond the details, a key point emerges. Birth rates have always been far below biological potential. The rate at each point in history has always been a choice made primarily in the pursuit of well-being. In the past the rates chosen were appropriate for a rural, agricultural society with high infant and early childhood mortality. (40) The recent drop reflects the shift from agriculture to industry and commerce, the expansion in education and work opportunities for women, and growing urbanization. In this new environment having fewer children "makes sense."
The industrial revolution ushered in an era of rapid income as well as population growth. It is possible that, as with population, there could be a lagged choice to reduce the rate of income growth, creating an income transition. Were it to occur, such a reduction would be a complex phenomenon. Its timing would differ among nations, as would the specific developments fostering it and the changes accompanying it. However, to take place, the reduction would need to be recognized as part of a strategy for the pursuit of well-being. The importance of this motivation rests on recent findings at the border between psychology and economics, which show that people have a general propensity to reject change even when it would be advantageous to accept it. (41) Thus, for change to take place, there has to be a powerful force such as the pursuit of well-being behind it.
How might low or even no income growth fit into a strategy for the pursuit of well-being in today's world? To begin to answer this question, a brief comparison of the U.S. with France is useful. Labor productivity (i.e., GDP produced per hour worked) is about equal in these two nations. However, work time in France is significantly less, reflecting a 35-rather than 40-hour week, a 40-rather than 46-week year, and other differences. Because income is productivity times work time, France has a significantly lower income than the U.S. (42) These differences reflect choices by the French to limit the work week and to mandate specific minimum levels of annual vacation. Such choices have been made in the past in various nations of Western Europe. (43) They could in principle be made in the U.S. as well. Other choices could also be made. For example, there could be a "sabbatical policy," providing time off at reduced pay during the course of a worker's life, funded using a mechanism similar to Social Security. There is a variety of evidence that choices such as these would enhance the well-being of workers in the U.S.:
• There is survey data showing that U.S. workers' ideal hours of paid work are much less than actual. (44) • Analyses of European vacation/leave policies have identified positive impacts on well-being.
(45)
• There are recent examples showing that sabbaticals even at a small fraction of full salary are attractive.
While the evidence just presented is specific to the U.S., the argument for a shift to the pursuit of well-being via time rather than material affluence is broadly applicable to all the rich nations. A reduction in paid work would provide additional time for other parts of workers' lives-family, friends, and civic activities. This would enhance their sense of well-being. Studies have shown that work and the commute associated with it is, in general, the least satisfying part of an individual's day. (47, 48) It would also help workers deal with the stress that accompanies the increasing intensity of work in all the rich nations. (49) This in turn would improve physical well-being by reducing stressrelated disorders. (50) When considering these arguments it is useful to note that, while workers in most rich nations have shorter hours than those in the U.S., there is evidence that reductions in working hours would still be broadly attractive. (51) For the nations of the West, the argument for a shift away from income growth as part of their pursuit of well-being and sustainability has been discussed. (52) However, the developments which might lead the rest of the world to make a similar shift have received less attention. As in the West, there is a recognition of the environmental impacts that are associated with economic growth. This recognition is reflected, for example, in China's rapid recent development of wind as a source of electricity generation. (53) However, concern about the environment alone is not likely to provide a sufficient impetus for developing nations to reduce the pace of their income growth. The West provides the model for the pursuit of well-being. So, if a focus on time rather than material affluence takes hold in the West it will likely spread, first to the other rich nations and then more broadly. However, in order to effectively foster lower income growth in the rest of the globe, the pressure to catch up with the West also needs to be reduced. The spread shown in Tables 1 and 2 early in this paper provides a measure of the difference in the goods and services which, on average, incomes in the West and the rest of the globe can purchase. In the current global consumer society the magnitude of this difference is well known to those in the developing nations. To increase the likelihood that they will limit the pace of their income growth, the spread needs to be reduced. Table 6 below shows Maddison's projections for income in 2030 and an alternative that illustrates an income transition. As in the "no-growth" scenario presented in Table 5 , the transition scenario assumes that the growth in global average income is held to 1.1 percent per year. This is roughly half the pace achieved from 1950 to 2003 and projected by Maddison for the future. In the transition income in the West remains constant, reflecting a very strong shift in focus to time affluence. Zero income growth in the West allows the developing nations to grow a bit more slowly and sustainably while still narrowing the income spread with the West. Income growth in the rest of the globe is less than in Maddison's projections, but still sufficient to move the Rest to near affluence. Rather than rising by over $9,000, the spread falls by nearly $3,000. Growth of 1.1 percent per year in income rather than Maddison's 2.1 percent provides a lower output in 2030. As in Table 5 , the reduction in output along with Maddison's assumed decline in intensity results in no growth in carbon emissions from fossil fuel use. This is picked up in the bottom line of the table. The income transition scenario presented in Table 6 shows progress, reducing carbon emissions in 2030 below what was expected based on Maddison's business-asusual assumptions. The progress is modest, holding emissions to 2003 levels rather than reducing them. However, the changes required to produce this progress are substantial and the possibilities for failure numerous:
• Income in the West in 2030 is held to the 2003 level, a reduction of more than one-third from Maddison's business-as-usual figure.
Achieving this requires dramatic progress in the income transition over the next 20 years.
• Any increase in the income in the West will add directly to the spread in 2030, making it that much harder to achieve the roughly 25 percent reduction in income growth in the Rest of the Globe which is part of the income transition scenario.
• The cuts in income growth for the West and the Rest need to be accompanied by the substantial decline in the intensity of emissions which is assumed by Maddison as part of business-as-usual conditions.
One can imagine many ways in which each of these three interlocking parts could fail to produce what is assumed. Consider the West. There is a spread in income among the nations in this group. Those at the "low end" might demand convergence, requiring the incomes for those at the top to fall if there is to be no change over all. Those at the "top end" may resist such "degrowth." The challenge for those committed to the pursuit of sustainability is to find ways to successfully address all the key parts.
Fighting the Three-Front War
The need to reduce the intensity of environmental impact per unit of economic activity and the pace of growth in output makes the pursuit of sustainability a "two-front war." The second front raises the issue of an income transition. When one considers the requirement for such a transition to extend beyond the West to the entire globe, the need to address income differences as well as intensity and output turns the pursuit of sustainability into a three-front war. The world in which we live makes fighting that war difficult.
We live in a world in which explosive economic growth has become "businessas-usual." A global consumer society poised on the brink of affluence is the context for the pursuit of sustainability today. As the results in Table 6 show, it is easy to describe a pattern of change that makes progress. The difficulty lies in overcoming the effects of explosive economic growth on our behavior and expectations. We have come to see such growth as both necessary and desirable. In fact, it is neither. Our ability to recognize that fact and to act on it in a coordinated global fashion will determine whether, in the end, we win the three-front war.
How might the struggle to win the three-front war begin? The answer offered here is with a vision for the future and a way of measuring our progress toward it. Donella Meadows (54) explained the role of vision quite clearly:
• "Vision is the most vital step in the policy process. If we don't know where we want to go, it makes little difference that we make great progress."
Meadows went on to explain how a vision should be developed:
• "The process of building a responsible vision of a sustainable world is not a rational one. It comes from values, not logic."
The discussion leading to our framing of the pursuit of sustainability as a three-front war suggests the values to guide the visioning: quality of life rather than greater income, global solidarity rather than global competition, and environmental stewardship rather than unlimited use of limited resources. As a recent volume, Exploring and Shaping International Futures, (55) makes clear, these are the values that increasingly inform global initiatives today. The notion of Plenitude developed by Juliet Schor (56) is an example of a vision driven by these values. Schor focuses primarily on the West. However, in the Introduction, the need to situate change in the West in the global context is clearly acknowledged. For the West, the key aspects of Plenitude are increased well-being and "cutting-edge green technology," features that resonate clearly with our discussion of what is required for a successful income transition. Particular aspects of Plenitude, such as "self-provisioning," are certainly open to question. However, stepping back from the details, it is essential to recognize Plenitude as a serious and important effort to provide the type of vision needed to help guide the fight in the three-front war.
Measurement follows vision. Once we know where we want to go, we need to be able to tell if we are moving in the right direction. The choice of a headline indicator is crucial.
• A headline indicator provides simple, clear information to policymakers and the general public, suitable for inclusion in the headlines of a newspaper article.
We need a replacement for our current headline indicator-real Gross Domestic Product-one which increases with gains in quality of life, global solidarity, and environmental stewardship. The Quality of Development Index (QDI) developed recently by the Tellus Institute (57) is designed to do exactly that.
Why put so much emphasis on measurement? The answer is in a well-known saying, generally attributed to Peter Drucker, "What gets measured gets done." As part of today's policy environment there is an influential report, Going for Growth, (58) which explains how nations could alter their policies to enhance their gains in GDP per capita. With the QDI as the headline indicator, one can imagine this report being replaced by a new publication called Going for a Better Life in which policy advice focused on gains in the areas that drive growth in the QDI would be provided.
